

**EFFECTS OF DEGLOBALIZATION AND COMPETITIVENESS ON TRADE  
RELATIONS LATIN AMERICA - CHINA**

**ABSTRACT**

The deglobalization affects the response of Latin American countries to the trade demands of the People's Republic of China. The increasing imports value from this Asian giant leads to a greater shortfall in the trade balance for the region. Companies and governments increase primary goods production and exports which are competitive. Based on competitiveness theory and international insertion approach, this work provides empirical evidence of how commodities production lead to a competitive advantage in an economical and political deglobalization. This research uses a descriptive analysis through static data. Among the findings, I confirm the need of increasing competitively commodities production by trade policies, exports incentives and with characteristics like good market efficiency, market size, technological readiness, innovation, and nontariff measures on temporary imports.

***Keywords:*** Trade policy, international business, globalization, productivity, reprimarization.

***JEL Codes:*** F13, F23, F60, 040, Q02

## EFFECTOS DE LA DESGLOBALIZACIÓN EN LAS RELACIONES COMERCIALES AMÉRICA LATINA – CHINA

### RESUMEN

El proceso de desglobalización afecta la respuesta de los países latinoamericanos a las demandas comerciales de la República Popular China. El incremento del valor de las importaciones desde este gigante asiático conduce a un mayor déficit en la balanza comercial para la región. Por ende, las empresas y los gobiernos aumentan sus capacidades de producción de bienes primarios y su exportación de forma competitiva. Basado en las teorías de la competitividad y de inserción internacional, este trabajo provee evidencia empírica de cómo la producción de commodities conduce a una ventaja competitiva en una desglobalización económica y política. Esta investigación utiliza un análisis descriptivo a través de datos estáticos. Entre los hallazgos, se encuentra que es necesario aumentar la producción de bienes primarios de manera competitiva con políticas comerciales, incentivos a las exportaciones, y con características como eficiencia del mercado, tamaño del mercado, preparación tecnológica, innovación, y de medidas no arancelarias a la importación temporal.

**Palabras clave:** Política comercial, negocios internacionales, globalización, productividad, reprimarización.

**Códigos JEL:** F13, F23, F60, O40, Q02

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Globalization and multilateralism are in process of transformation or redefinition. Trade flow, exports and imports, to and from China have increased in recent years, this has also led to increased production of raw materials, and in many cases of commodities for Latin American countries<sup>1</sup>. During the XVI Chair Raul Prebisch of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Chang mentions cutting out tariff barriers, settled by the World Trade Organization (WTO), affects economically to less developed countries in the long run. This is due to the have free trade between countries with different levels of development makes difficult high productivity and high technology in their industries. Therefore, these countries seek to protect their domestic industries that are growing, so are not affecting more the competitive ones (Chang in Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019).

From the global productive and competitive environment, we remark two characteristics. First, the liberalization of trade leads to increased income and economic development (Hou, 2019), despite the difficulties of the free trade between economies at different levels of development. And second, the productive reprimarization of Latin America (Bolinaga & Slipak, 2015) that implies the increase of production of primary goods, slowing down the technological development, productivity and innovation (Prieto & Rodríguez, 2017).

This work aims to analyze the responses of Latin American countries to the commercial demands of China, during the last ten (10) years. This research answers how productive capacities contribute to facing China as a rising trade partner in its insertion in Latin America (LA) by contributing to their international competitiveness and development? It states that liberalization of intrarregional trade and international economic integration shape its foreign policy trade to increase the competitiveness and productivity of Latin American countries. The research method is mixed by examining trade balance, productivity and competitiveness in the period 2008 - 2017 through a descriptive analysis. This work contains a distinguishing that is the study of the trade balance from the perspective of deglobalization that leads to competitive advantages for Latin American countries compared to its Chinese partner. As well, its main contributions lead to face Chinese insertion in LA from our commodities which are the base of a production by taking advantage of a deglobalized world.

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<sup>1</sup> The Latin American countries that comprise this study are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

This work comprises three sections. First, it presents a review of literature on the current context of China as a rising trade partner in Latin America and the current de-globalization. Second, a descriptive analysis addresses the bilateral trade variables (exports, imports) of China and Latin America. Third, it outlines the results to increase competitively production of primary goods with trade policy, export incentives and non-tariff measures (NTM) to the temporary imports. It is redefining competitiveness and productivity in Latin America in a context of deglobalization. By Finally, the present discussion and conclusions on productivity and competitiveness for Latin American countries in their insertion in the world and in Asian markets.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

The growth of the People's Republic of China, from now on China, gives the name as a rising trade partner in the world and Latin America. It leads usually to discuss: its economic and political model, and the real effects on its economic development. Therefore, confronting the terms of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Garred, 2018) and, the whole multilateral system. Given that these three issues are still changing, and the effects just are beginning to glimpse.

In the last 10 years or even since joining the WTO in 2001, this trade ally is creating a new global landscape to competitiveness and productivity of developing countries, but specifically in Latin America (Efrat *et al*, 2018). We consider two categories of analysis: defining a rising trade partner and reconceptualizing competitiveness and productivity for Latin America about this ally with characteristics of a global trade power.

The current scenario poses different opportunities and challenges for China that it has been facing since the beginning of the 21st century. First, its accession to the WTO by assuming the Protocol of Accession (WTO, 2001) about the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Feng & Ma, 2019). It is trade, cut of tariffs on imports and exports and foreign exchange control (Garred, 2018). This makes up a profit space as the Most Favored Nation (MFN) for its entry into markets such as the United States and the European Union (Feng, Li, & Swenson, 2017). Second, its openness to the world is towards increasing its commercial relations with or without a free trade agreement. At following, there is an overview of China's trade relations.

Table 1

## China Preferential Trade Arrangements

<b>China</b>	<b>Preferential Commercial Arrangements</b>	<b>Countries</b>	<b>Year (effective)</b>
<b>Grantor of</b>	<i>Duty-free</i> franchise treatment for least developed countries	Least Developed Countries (LDC)	July 1, 2010
<b>Beneficiary of</b>	Generalized System of Preferences	Armenia Australia Russia Kazakhstan Norway New Zealand Turkey European Union	April 6, 2016 January 1, 1974 January 1, 2010 January 1, 2010 October 1, 1971 January 1, 1972 January 1, 2002 July 1, 1971

*Note:* Own elaboration. Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTAs) (WTOa, 2019).

Then, regional trade agreements (RTA) signed by China are bilaterally with eleven (11) countries, including Chile, Costa Rica and Peru in Latin America. There are two regional blocs agreements: the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and two special commercial areas of China: Hong Kong and Macao.

Table 2

## China Regional Trade Agreements

<b>Notified and in force</b>	<b>Year (effective)</b>	<b>Previously announced</b>	<b>Start date of negotiations</b>
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA)	June 17, 1976 (M) September 17, 2013 (S)	Framework Agreement for Economic Cooperation across the Straits (ECFA) of Taiwan	June 29, 2010
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	January 1, 2005 (M) July 1, 2007 (S)	Republic of Moldova	March 5, 2018
Australia	December 20, 2015	Norway	September 18, 2008

Chile	October 1, 2006 (M) August 1, 2010 (S)
Republic of Korea	December 20, 2015
Costa Rica	August 1, 2011
Georgia	January 1, 2018
Hong Kong, China	June 29, 2003
Macao, China	October 17, 2003
New Zealand	October 1, 2008
Singapore	January 1, 2009
Iceland	July 1, 2014
Pakistan	October 10, 2009
Peru	March 1, 2010
Switzerland	July 1, 2014

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*Note:* Own elaboration. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) from the World Trade Organization (WTOB, 2019) M: Merchandise, S: Services.

From this scenario, China's trade relations with the world is worth noting its main trading partners in the framework or not of a signed agreement. According to Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC, 2017), the United States with whom does not have a free trade agreement, it represents 20% of its exports. It is followed up Hong Kong 11%, Japan 6,5%, Germany 4,5% and South Korea 4,1 %, with whom already has a trade agreement. On the origin of its imports, its main partners are other Asian countries accounting for 9,8%, South Korea 9,7%, Japan 8,8%, but also, the United States 8,7% and Germany 6,2% (OEC, 2017).

In noting the participation of Latin America, the main trading partners of China for the destination of its exports without free trade agreement is Brazil 1,1% and a current agreement is Chile 0,64%. About the origin of its imports, it is also Brazil 3,1% and Chile 1,2% (OEC, 2017). On the latter country, the free trade agreement was updated with entry into force on March 1, 2019, according to the Foreign Trade Information System (SICE by its acronym in Spanish) (2019).

The character of rising trade partner is also evidenced by its participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) since 1991. China's participation in the ASEAN, with Japan and South Korea are the so - called ASEAN +3 who, although not full members, have a regional trade agreement with ASEAN. Also, it is important for trade to carrying out the Regional

Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) joined with ASEAN +6 (additionally, India, Australia and New Zealand) (Chiang, 2019).

Current economic development leads to question the validity of capitalism (Chang, 2019), the viability and toughness of globalization, bringing to a deglobalization scenario (James, 2018). This links to resulting events such as the financial crisis of 2008, the political and economic protectionism, and the on-shoring and re-shoring (Grandinetti & Tabacco, 2015). It results in trade decrease, the governments responses to financial crises by using protectionist measures, such as the United States did (Manzi, 2019), the China-United States trade war (Carvalho *et al*, 2019), or to the United Kingdom withdraws the European Union (Samson, 2017).

Thus, deglobalization represents a scenario of opportunities to increase the production of primary goods in LA, strong as a periphery region (Cardona T., 2019) (Vásquez Merchán, 2018) and adapting its development model towards international insertion (Ocampo, 2015).

### 3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Latin American countries have opted for development through their commercial and national production policy (Ocampo, 2015). This is from the structuralism of ECLAC to the economic opening, from an Industrialization by Import Substitution approach to productive industrialization and, now with greater zeal, to the use of technologies in this fourth revolution, there have been changes in the economic development of the region.

The historical influence of China in Latin America (Terán Samanamud, 2014) implies taking risks and seizing opportunities. Recently, it is the second and third largest trading partner for the region, not necessarily inclined the trade balance into deficit, because this has been the level in the last ten years old for most of these countries. China represents the increase in the trade balance in exports and imports, but not necessarily the increase in its deficit, as well as adjusting its goods towards productivity (Fan, Li, & Yeaple, 2018). Therefore, it postulates the following hypotheses:

- H<sub>1</sub> *A productive trend of Latin American countries (primary and manufactured goods), traditionally based on primary goods or commodities production, provides a competitive disadvantage for flow trade of goods and services from China - LA in the current deglobalization process.*
- H<sub>2</sub> *A competitive advantage based on primary goods and commodities production without added value is sustained by the quality of its products and the innovation in*

*its processes, it leads to strengthen reprimarization of Latin American economies, representing a commercial opportunity.*

Then, it follows the relationship between the commercial flows of primary and manufactured goods between Latin America and the world and China. This allows identifying business opportunities in this region and production trends in Latin American countries. Also, it stands changes in commercial foreign policy and how it shapes the agendas of productivity and competitiveness to meet the economic growth and development.

#### 4. METHODOLOGY

Through a descriptive analysis, the behavior of the production of primary and manufactured goods of Latin American countries is observed, followed by the commercial flow with China, in the period 2008-2017. About hypothesis 1, it leads to the question if the region is responding to the commercial demands of the Asian giant or there is a direct relationship with the increase in commodity production.

Table 3

Exports of primary and manufactured goods from Latin America - World 2008 - 2017 (Percentages of the total value of exports FOB)


<b>Primary Goods</b>										
<b>Country / year</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>
Argentina	68,8	67,4	66,8	67,4	67,9	67,6	67,8	70,6	73,4	71,2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	94,2	94,2	91,4	94,5	91,8	94,1	94,3	91,0	90,8	91,6
Brazil	55,2	60,5	63,4	65,9	65,0	63,7	65,2	61,9	60,1	62,4
Chile	84,0	86,6	87,4	86,2	85,6	85,6	85,4	85,2	85,0	85,8
Colombia	67,6	70,8	76,1	80,6	82,5	82,4	82,4	75,8	74,5	78,5
Ecuador	91,3	90,8	90,2	92,1	91,0	93,3	93,9	92,3	92,5	93,8
Mexico	26,4	24,0	24,0	27,6	25,7	23,7	21,2	17,1	17,0	17,9
Panama	8,4	6,2	5,9	6,5	3,0	4,0	5,0	4,6	9,9	...
Paraguay	93,5	93,3	92,6	92,4	91,2	91,9	90,5	89,9	90,6	88,8
Peru	83,9	83,6	86,3	86,4	85,5	85,5	85,2	85,0	86,9	88,6
Uruguay	71,0	74,4	74,0	72,0	75,9	75,6	76,3	74,8	77,9	79,8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	95,6	97,1	95,7	98,0	98,3	98,2	...	...	...	...
<b>Manufactured Goods</b>										
Argentina	31,2	32,6	33,2	32,6	32,1	32,4	32,2	29,4	26,6	28,8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	5,8	5,8	8,6	5,5	8,2	5,9	5,7	9	9,2	8,4
Brazil	44,8	39,5	36,6	34,1	35	36,3	34,8	38,1	39,9	37,6
Chile	16	13,4	12,6	13,8	14,4	14,4	14,6	14,8	15	14,2



Colombia	32,4	29,2	23,9	19,4	17,5	17,6	17,6	24,2	25,5	21,5
Ecuador	8,7	9,2	9,8	7,9	9	6,7	6,1	7,7	7,5	6,2
Mexico	73,6	76	76	72,4	74,3	76,3	78,8	82,9	83	82,1
Panama	91,6	93,8	94,1	93,5	97	96	95	95,4	90,1	...
Paraguay	6,5	6,7	7,4	7,6	8,8	8,1	9,5	10,1	9,4	11,2
Peru	16,1	16,4	13,7	13,6	14,5	14,5	14,8	15	13,1	11,4
Uruguay	29	25,6	26	28	24,1	24,4	23,7	25,2	22,1	20,2
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	4,4	2,9	4,3	2	1,7	1,8	...	...	...	...

*Note:* Data extracted from CEPALSTAT (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019).

The export of primary and manufactured goods from LA to the rest of the world presents an outlook of increased production and export of primary goods and still share the highest percentage in total production. Therefore, the term that returns to the productive scenario and that takes more strength is that of ‘reprimarization’ of the economies, especially when talking about the commercial flow towards the Asian giant (See *Figure 1*).



*Figure 1.* Trade flow from Latin America to China 2008-2017 (million USD\$)

*Note:* Own elaboration. Data extracted from UNComtrade (UN Trade Division, 2019). Exports and Imports of goods using the Harmonized System (HS) classification revisions: HS 5 and HS 4.

Different authors study the trade flow and the relationship with productive repression from the individual analysis of Latin American countries against the entry of China. Bolinaga and Slipal (2015) categorized the asymmetric link between the regional power China and secondary regional power Argentina. By addressing the influence of the Asian country through measures of investment and free trade as signing agreements with Chile, Costa Rica and Peru, and negotiation process with Colombia. The methodology that these authors used is the Grubel- Lloyd indices and the intra-industrial trade index (ICI). Among their findings, they found the strength of center-periphery-based logic.

By using a descriptive analysis, hypothesis 2 shows that distribution of exports from Latin American countries to China by stage of processing in the period 2008- 2017 (see Annex 1). It comprises a lower contribution to the export of capital goods has decreased compared to 2016. It is significantly in countries such as Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Uruguay. In consumer goods, there are Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. In intermediate goods, there are Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador. In contrast, the export of primary goods has increased 2,8 times, it means 64,57% from 2008 to 2017, with exceptions such as Argentina and Bolivia have been decreasing their last three years.

Some authors address trade relations between Latin America and the Caribbean with China (Prieto & Rodriguez, 2017) in exports and imports. Then, it consecutively again shows a deficit in the trade balance versus the Asian giant. Cooney (2016) analyzes Brazil by studying the implications of reprimarization to the environment and development, guided by China's interest in counting on countries that provide it with raw materials. About the effects on the environment, Ray (2017) states current LA production scenario is in reprimarization, with a high impact on the environment.

Similarly, Terán (2014) analyzes the historical trade production of Ecuador and Peru with China, identifying a negative trade balance and a constant increase in Ecuador's imports in particular of capital goods. The same happens, but to a lesser extent, for Peru in 2011 due to the entry into force of the free trade agreement with China. Other authors address relations with Colombia because of a sense of strategic partnership, but without a clear strategy of their relationship (Pastrana Buelvas, Castro, & González, 2017).

Therefore, it argues that trade flows are not a sole determinant of reprimarization that influences the competitiveness and productivity of Latin American countries. Ortiz Velásquez (2017) points out that it is necessary to review the foreign direct investment (FDI) of LA and China. However, the trade flow shows a strong trend to increase production of primary goods, where it is necessary to evaluate competitiveness through market efficiency, market size, technological preparation, innovation.

## **5. RESULTS**

The redefinition of competitiveness and productivity in deglobalization implies adapting Latin American economies to the increase primary goods production with an added value. It means their high quality and responsiveness capacity to large economies demands such as China. While in Global Competitiveness Report 2019 (Schwab, 2019), it found that, among other findings, the major concern of countries is to uphold its development level. Also, it is the essential outlet for periphery economies until they reach a high enough innovation and productivity.

Therefore, in its latest version studies competitiveness in the current fourth stage of the industrial revolution, with an early model called 'Global Competitiveness Index 4.0'. There, it defines that, for the current scenario, it is not a zero-sum game, since it means that competitiveness is achievable for all countries, increasingly direct relationship to greater productivity (Schwab, 2019). The presence of China in Latin America settles an increase in positions and general performance of Latin American economies in last year which Competitiveness and Innovation indexes show.

Therefore, it notes that another component necessary to determine competitiveness is productivity and innovation. The latter is also understood as a determinant of economic growth. It sets a relation among productive factors affecting or influencing in its scope (Schwab, 2019). That is, these factors that affect productivity are quality, disposition and level of progress: natural resources, human resources (labor), capital invested and technological progress.

## **6. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS**

Business opportunities in Latin America for both China and the rest of the world go with the production trends of the countries in this region. The Global Innovation Report is a tool to translate productivity. Since its objective aims at capturing the multidimensional facets of innovation and providing tools that can help adapt policies to the growth of long - term production, productivity improvement and job growth (Cornell University, INSEAD, and WIPO, 2019). This

is through its five *input* pillars: institutions, human capital and research, infrastructure, market sophistication and business sophistication; and of the two *output* pillars: knowledge and technological development and creative outputs.

Therefore, it finds competitiveness for Latin American companies is to face the challenges in improving their productivity and innovation based on their greater production than are the primary goods. In this way, these companies can respond to major global markets, which are countries rather than geographical zones or agreements between regional blocs.

The productivity and competitiveness of Latin American countries have evolved in recent years. Looking at the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 2019 and Global Innovation Index (GII) 2019, points out a breakthrough in different Latin American economies.

## **7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

In conclusion, it is that, in relation to productivity and competitiveness, foreign trade policy of Latin American countries strongly bases on primary goods. The export of such goods largely represents its Gross Domestic Product and the possibility of economic growth. While China is the 'factory of the world', Latin America is still the 'provider of natural resources and primary goods'. Thus, it is not easy taking a step towards innovation and, therefore, productivity. The circle of production in the current capitalist and globalization system encourages those roles in the international economic system. However, the opportunity is on comparative advantages of primary goods and make them competitive in their processes or added value.

On the one hand, the productivity agendas of Latin American countries should aim to improve innovation, and trade policies that encourage exports that include innovation or transformation incentives. As well, imports need implementing non-tariff measures that simplify the modes of temporary imports for active improvement, transformation or assembly. Besides, foreign trade policies of the countries in this region hardly increase their exports in capital, consumer and intermediate goods. Although in the period studied, those evidently made progress, but last three years decreased. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the national conjunctures in domestic and foreign policy of production and foreign trade.

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*Annex I. Exports to China processing stage in the period 2008- 2017 (Thousands of US\$)*

<b>Processing Stage / Year</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>
<b>Capital goods</b>	<b>1.221.906</b>	<b>1.172.680</b>	<b>1.338.530</b>	<b>1.697.886</b>	<b>2.627.653</b>	<b>1.994.115</b>	<b>1.893.556</b>	<b>2.747.689</b>	<b>3.006.634</b>	<b>3.025.733</b>
Argentina	31.023	15.811	15.029	22.761	12.634	18.842	12.026	64.634	9.243	10.304
Bolivia	...	...	10	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Brazil	610.330	634.214	714.290	1.038.436	1.395.317	725.506	548.055	1.277.172	1.104.175	936.530
Chile	25.490	32.615	7.010	13.021	14.430	32.584	21.529	6.359	7.963	4.627
Colombia	5.308	572	388	409	946	12.023	4.987	781	1.823	3.107
Ecuador	1.500	325	446	313	174	426	1.046	3.637	807	679
Mexico	543.994	487.784	596.832	606.839	1.186.484	1.200.389	1.279.742	1.384.276	1.877.344	2.061.106
Panama	446	403	835	181	625	608	223	...	16	...
Paraguay	303	152	331	164	195	416	1.204	352	84	367
Peru	1.564	249	1.101	2.289	465	1.519	1.293	795	670	1.482
Uruguay	530	398	974	13.348	16.384	1.802	23.452	9.683	4.508	7.530
Venezuela	1.420	156	1.283	125	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>Consumption Goods</b>	<b>488.771</b>	<b>699.097</b>	<b>1.295.830</b>	<b>1.744.127</b>	<b>1.651.030</b>	<b>2.251.818</b>	<b>2.516.696</b>	<b>2.059.281</b>	<b>1.690.121</b>	<b>2.067.292</b>
Argentina	47.363	37.071	55.492	67.864	70.656	67.099	74.252	72.045	63.981	94.067
Bolivia	582	323	784	95	309	783	194	395	156	271
Brazil	166.250	153.493	214.148	298.735	232.949	241.078	210.543	222.651	211.094	233.420

Processing Stage / Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Chile	67.241	80.637	120.049	137.848	198.433	182.123	176.888	251.592	278.799	445.831
Colombia	1.964	24.633	66.611	31.560	38.934	32.815	36.400	20.764	5.732	8.250
Ecuador	785	2.324	11.408	13.176	1.626	1.548	5.108	13.054	21.819	20.114
Mexico	130.497	179.368	667.502	962.346	980.488	1.560.576	1.840.486	1.317.365	970.125	1.098.686
Panama	2.571	1.811	1.853	3.066	2.347	2.954	825	237	3.065	...
Paraguay	113	236	255	112	676	325	205	447	555	140
Peru	70.125	217.948	155.234	223.082	115.606	156.141	165.939	155.643	129.692	161.773
Uruguay	889	781	1.960	6.204	9.005	6.374	5.858	5.086	5.102	4.740
Venezuela	391	473	532	37	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>Intermediate Goods</b>	<b>12.302.039</b>	<b>17.195.335</b>	<b>19.720.745</b>	<b>22.641.877</b>	<b>21.770.703</b>	<b>21.707.336</b>	<b>19.945.655</b>	<b>18.456.793</b>	<b>17.090.176</b>	<b>19.065.162</b>
Argentina	1.810.323	1.916.714	706.918	894.960	1.270.224	1.119.347	789.245	758.089	431.680	434.837
Bolivia	49.356	48.548	67.495	93.483	89.730	99.506	98.626	57.932	88.172	22.007
Brazil	2.918.478	3.897.146	4.088.730	5.296.577	5.423.095	6.058.444	5.583.645	5.474.560	5.327.561	5.191.953
Chile	5.614.102	8.861.188	11.622.513	12.753.446	11.551.253	11.016.118	10.696.352	9.366.351	8.655.225	9.516.950
Colombia	274.267	385.250	400.327	383.898	463.386	399.227	240.985	262.219	129.144	237.551
Ecuador	10.241	20.938	45.937	79.078	56.161	79.659	72.619	118.535	135.063	110.301
Mexico	391.175	593.788	621.309	845.545	704.538	505.261	426.254	371.135	551.229	888.300
Panama	33.957	9.152	9.373	5.019	16	11	281	...	19.043	...
Paraguay	94.183	24.552	30.052	26.903	15.973	24.453	24.160	16.378	10.995	15.752

Processing Stage / Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Peru	944.445	1.177.216	1.742.053	2.056.642	2.067.470	2.208.304	1.845.386	1.914.836	1.657.036	2.534.985
Uruguay	74.086	92.343	102.729	112.435	94.801	188.708	168.102	116.757	85.027	112.526
Venezuela	87.427	168.499	283.310	93.892	34.057	8.297	...	...	...	...
<b>Raw materials</b>	<b>24.705.215</b>	<b>26.708.022</b>	<b>44.832.570</b>	<b>59.408.303</b>	<b>56.622.976</b>	<b>66.031.065</b>	<b>59.831.573</b>	<b>50.498.682</b>	<b>52.243.323</b>	<b>69.741.420</b>
Argentina	4.466.248	1.696.864	5.021.295	5.047.438	3.714.730	4.306.240	3.584.369	4.278.952	3.920.215	3.785.649
Bolivia	79.443	81.719	140.347	243.037	226.447	219.775	335.203	407.285	384.964	379.108
Brazil	12.820.358	16.309.479	25.755.861	37.654.407	33.989.312	38.964.225	34.246.122	28.609.644	28.473.504	41.114.575
Chile	2.812.552	4.054.242	5.574.990	5.724.553	6.319.443	7.836.439	7.297.990	6.595.057	8.451.964	9.123.471
Colombia	161.401	539.265	1.499.281	1.573.172	2.839.792	4.658.078	5.472.723	1.979.908	990.407	1.750.589
Ecuador	374.940	100.620	270.943	99.282	333.375	486.308	406.303	587.735	498.687	636.935
Mexico	977.003	945.494	2.309.554	3.548.580	2.835.914	3.200.129	2.413.031	1.770.638	1.997.860	2.655.479
Panama	15.128	11.149	25.976	32.260	...	...	...	...	14.863	...
Paraguay	2.189	10.207	3.593	3.209	25.135	31.913	23.509	13.057	9.246	11.340
Peru	2.718.860	2.682.545	3.538.278	4.690.039	5.659.448	4.988.063	5.029.969	5.320.076	6.704.901	8.927.959
Uruguay	96.028	141.557	258.178	394.158	676.055	1.094.123	1.022.353	936.330	796.712	1.356.315
Venezuela	181.064	134.881	434.273	398.166	3.326	245.773	...	...	...	...

*Note:* Data extracted from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS, 2019).